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Jaycees Reconsidered: Judge Richard S.
Arnold and the Freedom of Association
Richard W. Garnett*
In the summer of 1984, Judge Richard S. Arnold was
reversed three times by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In Nix v. Williams, the Justices disagreed with Judge Arnold's
conclusion that any "inevitable discovery" exception to the
Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should include a
requirement that the government establish an absence of official
bad faith.' That same week, the Court rejected Judge Arnold's
conclusion that the Interstate Commerce Act preempted
2
Minnesota's condemnation statute. And, in Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Court held-without dissent-that the First
Amendment did not shield the Jaycees' men-only membership
policy from the non-discrimination requirements of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act.3  All in all, Judge Arnold's
opinions in these three cases were rejected by a combined vote
of twenty-three to two. 4 More than a decade later, he quipped to
some of his law clerks, "no one can be that wrong."
Well, maybe some could be that wrong,5 but not, I think,
Judge Arnold. Putting aside, for now, the merits of the Supreme
Court's reversals of his inevitable-discovery and federal-
preemption rulings, Judge Arnold's position and decision in the
* Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. 467 U.S. 431 (1984), rev'g 700 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983).
2. Hayfield N. R.R. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622 (1984), rev'g
693 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1982).
3. 468 U.S. 609 (1984), rev'g United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th
Cir. 1983).
4. In Jaycees, the vote was 7-0. Id. Chief Justice Burger, who had in 1935 been
chapter president of the Jaycees in St. Paul, Minnesota, and Justice Blackmun, who was a
former member of the Minneapolis chapter, did not participate in the case. Id The
decision in Hayfield was unanimous; the vote in Nix was 7-2. Hayfield, 467 U.S. at 622;
Nix, 467 U.S. at 434.
5. In the Supreme Court's October Term of 1996, for example, opinions authored by
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit were
reversed unanimously by the Justices in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997),
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), and Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
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Jaycees case deserved, and still deserve, more thoughtful and
sympathetic treatment.
Unfortunately, however, even some of Judge Arnold's
many friends and fans tend to treat as something of an
embarrassing lapse or anomalous error his conclusion in that
case that, because "the First Amendment . . . must[,] on
occasion, protect the association of which we disapprove," the
Constitution therefore protected the Jaycees' right not to admit
women to full membership.6  Judge Patricia Wald, for
example-in the study, Judge Arnold and Individual Rights,
which she contributed to a volume dedicated by a prominent law
review to Judge Arnold and his work-reacted to his
"enigmatic" Jaycees opinion with a patronizing and clunky golf
analogy, suggesting that "[p]erhaps the best explanation lies in
Judge Arnold's own golfing motion-even at his peak, Jack
Nicholas [sic] had an off-day." 7  And, remarking on what
seemed to her the tension between Judge Arnold's decision in
Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Association 8-an "exotic gender
discrimination case"-in which he invalidated on equal-
protection grounds the state's "half court" rules for high-school
girls' basketball, on the one hand, and Jaycees, on the other,
Judge Wald settled for the explanation that "in the one case he
was dealing with a game, in the other, with a constitutional right.
For recognition of the rights at stake," she concluded, "he gets
an A; for balancing, he gets a B-."
9
6. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1561.
7. Patricia M. Wald, Judge Arnold and Individual Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 35, 53
(1993).
8. 468 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
9. Wald, supra note 7, at 49, 55-56. 1 have expressed my disappointment before with
Judge Wald's assessment of Judge Arnold's work in what she frames as women's-rights
cases. Richard W. Garnett, Tribute to the Honorable Richard S. Arnold, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 204, 212 (1999). Responding to the "skeptic[ism]" of "some women's groups"
regarding Judge Arnold's "position in abortion cases," she insisted that, "[e]xcept for
perhaps one case, . . . his record stands up well as a defender of a woman's right to control
her body ...... Wald, supra note 7, at 50. In that "one case"-Reproductive Health
Service v. Webster-Judge Arnold expressed in dissent the view that the Constitution
permits the State of Missouri to express a view "about when human life begins," i.e., at
"conception." 851 F.2d 1071, 1085 (8th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Arnold, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), rev 'd, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). No doubt hoping to allay the fears
of the interest groups and political advisors who were, at the time, compiling short lists for
President Clinton of potential nominees to the Supreme Court, Judge Wald observed, in
Judge Arnold's defense, that his "narrow difference" with the majority "suggests not the
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The analysis of Jaycees offered by the Judge's brother and
judicial colleague, Morris Sheppard Arnold, is more sound, and
reveals a better understanding both of Judge Arnold's
commitments and of the constitutional question presented in
Jaycees. As his brother suggested, it is probably Judge Arnold's
"classical liberal" "high regard for individual rights and private
ordering"-and not his high regard for games-that provides
"the best way to comprehend [his] controversial ruling in
[Jaycees]."'10
Judge Wald had asked, with respect to the Judge's rulings
in Dodson and Jaycees, how a "judge so quick to see the
diminished future of a young athlete forced to play by 'girls'
rules' [could] find it acceptable to bar young professional
women from such an imijortant business and social networking
group as the Jaycees[.]" 1  But, of course, Judge Arnold had
nothing to say about the "acceptab[ility]" of the Jaycees'
decision to exclude women from full membership, except
perhaps to hint that he personally disapproved. 12 (Indeed, I am
confident that no one has ever suspected Judge Arnold of
indulging any sympathy either for state-sponsored
discrimination or for invidious private prejudices.) Instead, the
question he addressed was whether, given our constitutional
commitment to the freedom of speech, it was "acceptable" to
slightest ambivalence as to the fundamental validity of Roe v. Wade," and insisted that
"orthodox feminists must recognize that his position is in most respects far more expansive
than the present Supreme Court's." Wald, supra note 7, at 52-53. As I have written,
though,
it could just as well be said that in [Webster] Judge Arnold demonstrated, by
holding that a State may write into law, for purposes unrelated to abortion, its
commitment to the principle that human life begins at conception, the
independence from political orthodoxies and ideological demands that good
judging requires.
Garnett, supra, at 211 n.30 (emphasis added); see also id at 211 (expressing regret that
some of the articles published in the tribute volume to which Judge Wald contributed
seemed "designed to smuggle Judge Arnold's reasonableness past a gaggle of suspicious
ideologues and self-appointed guarantors of progressive purity").
10. Morris S. Arnold, Tribute to the Honorable Richard S. Arnold, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 194, 197-98 (1999).
11. Wald, supra note 7, at 56.
12. See Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1571 ("An organization of young people, as opposed to
young men, may be more 'felicitous,' more socially desirable, in the view of the State
Legislature, or in the view of the judges of this Court, but it will be substantially different
from the Jaycees as it now exists."); cf id. at 1561 ("Still less do we intend to express our
own view of what the Jaycees is doing.").
5892005]
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force a private, non-commercial association to change its
message and identity. In both Dodson and Jaycees, then, Judge
Arnold's civil-libertarian commitments prompted him to cast a
skeptical eye on the efforts of government-whether through
chauvinistic basketball rules or a well-meaning anti-
discrimination law-to pursue its own or the majority's agenda
at the expense of constitutionally protected rights. 13 For Judge
Arnold, governments constrained by our First Amendment and
by a respect for the freedom of speech are limited to persuasion,
not coercion, when trying to influence and shape the beliefs and
expression of citizens and associations.
Most readers are probably familiar already with the salient
facts of Jaycees and with the outlines of the arguments raised,
endorsed, and rejected in that case. 14 By way of a summary, it
would be hard to improve on Judge Arnold's own succinct
statement:
The United States Jaycees, a young men's civic and service
organization, does not admit women to full membership. A
Minnesota statute.., forbids discrimination on the basis of
sex in "places of public accommodation." The Supreme
Court of Minnesota . . . interpreted this phrase to include
the Jaycees, and the Minnesota Department of Human
Rights ... ordered the Jaycees to admit women to its local
chapters in Minnesota. In this suit brought by the Jaycees,
we are asked to declare the statute, as so applied and
interpreted, unconstitutional, as in violation of the rights of
speech, petition, assembly, and association guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 15
Now, it is worth noting briefly, at the outset, a few matters
that were not at issue, either before Judge Arnold and the Court
of Appeals or before the Justices of the Supreme Court. For
starters, it was neither seriously argued nor judicially entertained
13. See, e.g., id. at 1561 ("[The First Amendment] must, on occasion, include the
freedom to choose what the majority believes is wrong.").
14. The facts in the necessarily incomplete description that follows are taken from the
three courts' decisions in this case: United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766
(D. Minn. 1982), rev'd, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
15. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1561 (citation omitted).
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that either the United States Jaycees or its local chapters were
state actors subject to the non-discrimination requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 16 The "discrimination" at issue here-
and Judge Arnold did not deny that the Jaycees practiced
"discrimination"-was, as he observed, "nongovernmental."'
17
And so, at least part of the answer to Judge Wald's question-
i.e., how a "judge so quick to see the diminished future of a
young athlete forced to play by 'girls' rules' [could] find it
acceptable to bar young professional women from such an
important business and social networking group as the
Jaycees" -is that the question whether government may
discriminate against young women by forcing them to play
basketball by different rules is quite different from the question
of whether the Constitution requires government to tolerate
private associations' decisions to discriminate in their
membership criteria. That is, for Judge Arnold, the same
democratic values that underlie our constitutional commitment
to equal protection of the laws are the basis for a no-less-
fundamental commitment to limited government and a free civil
society.
Second, and relatedly, the various federal courts who
confronted the case had no occasion to weigh in on the
determination by the Minnesota Department of Human Rights
and the Supreme Court of Minnesota that the Jaycees was, in
fact, a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of
that state's Human Rights Act.' 9 In other words, the question
16. See, e.g., Jaycees, 534 F. Supp. at 772 ("The doctrine of state action is not at issue
here . . . .The absence of state action does not preclude an entity's being a public
accommodation."). Several courts, however, had considered this question. See Jaycees,
709 F.2d at 1561 n.1 (citing cases).
17. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1561.
18. Wald, supra note 7, at 56.
19. The relevant proceedings and conclusions on this question are set out in Judge
Murphy's opinion for the United States District Court, Jaycees, 534 F. Supp. at 767-68, and
in Judge Arnold's opinion, Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1563-65. For citations to some other cases
considering this issue, see, e.g., 709 F.2d at 1561 n. 1. According to the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, the Jaycees were a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of
Minnesota Statute section 363.01(18), and not a "private association[] [or] organization[]"
exempted from the provision's non-discrimination requirements, because, inter alia,
"[mien between 18 and 35 are indiscriminately admitted to membership ... without any
selectivity"; "[tihe organization is in the business of selling memberships, a business it
assiduously promotes"; and "[c]ommercial language, e.g., 'marketing,' is used to describe
the recruitment of new members ...." Id. at 1564-65 (summarizing and paraphrasing the
2005] 591
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for Judge Arnold and his colleagues was not so much whether
the Jaycees was within the Act's intended and actual regulatory
scope-it was-but whether the First Amendment permitted the
Act to require the Jaycees to admit women to full membership,
notwithstanding its men-only policy. 20  Similarly, in two of its
recent, leading "expressive association" cases-Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston2 1 and
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 22-the Supreme Court focused
on the constraints imposed by the Constitution on the application
of local anti-discrimination laws, and not on whether Boston's
St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day Parade or the Boy Scouts of
America were, in fact "public accommodations" within the
meaning of those laws.21
Returning to the case's procedural history: after the
relevant Minnesota officials and judges concluded that the
United States Jaycees was covered by the state's Human Rights
Act, and that its membership policy constituted an unfair
discriminatory practice within the meaning of that Act, and after
the Jaycees was enjoined either from discriminating on the basis
of sex in membership or revoking the charters of local chapters
that ended such discrimination, it brought the matter before the24
United States District Court. There, the Jaycees contended,
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision). As Judge Arnold observed, "We of course take as a
given that the Jaycees is a 'place of public accommodation' within the meaning of the
Minnesota statute." Id. at 1566. He later noted, though, that the Jaycees might well have
been "startled" by the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of that statute. Id. at
1577.
20. The federal courts did consider the question of whether the Act, as authoritatively
construed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.
See Jaycees, 534 F. Supp. at 772-74 (holding that the Act, so construed, was neither vague
nor overbroad); Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1576-78 (declining to reach "overbreadth" issue but
concluding that "the Minnesota Supreme Court, in the course of interpreting the key
statutory phrase, has... introduced such an element of uncertainty as to make it impossible
for people of common intelligence to know whether their organizations are subject to the
law or not"); Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 629-31 (agreeing with the District Court that the
"concerns" underlying the void-for-vagueness doctrine were "not seriously implicated by
the Minnesota Act, either on its face or as construed in this case," and the "state court's
articulated willingness to adopt limiting constructions that would exclude private groups
from the statute's reach . . . does not create an unacceptable risk of application to a
substantial amount of protected conduct").
21. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
22. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
23. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640; Hurley, 515 U.S. 557.
24. Jaycees, 534 F. Supp. at 768.
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among other things, that this application and enforcement of the
Act violated its freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment. 25
Judge Murphy rejected the Jaycees' arguments and its First
Amendment challenge.26  She opened her analysis by
questioning "whether association not directed at the exercise of
other First Amendment rights enjoys constitutional
protection.",27  Assuming, though, that "association is itself
protected," she stated that the Jaycees' "practice of
distinguishing the rights and privileges of men and women
members" was "not afforded affirmative constitutional
protection .... 28 What's more, she continued, "[e]ven
assuming the Jaycees' membership policy constituted an
exercise of a protected right to associational freedom, the state
has shown a sufficiently compelling interest"-namely, the
"interest in preventing discrimination in public accommodations
on the basis of sex"-"to overcome such a right.",29  Finally,
Judge Murphy observed that the application and enforcement of
the Human Rights Act "does not require the Jaycees to abandon
its purpose of providing leadership training, self-improvement,
and community involvement to young men.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion
written by Judge Arnold, reversed. 31 For starters, Judge Arnold
25. Id.
26. Id. at 774.
27. Id. at 770.
28. Id.; see also Jaycees, 534 F. Supp. at 771 ("While the Jaycees has a right to
believe that its organization should only advance the interests of men, its practice of
excluding women from equal benefits does not enjoy protection under the circumstances
presented.").
29. Id. at 377; see also id ("The right to associate is not absolute; even a significant
interference with the right of association may be sustained if the state demonstrates a
sufficiently important interest and avoids unnecessary abridg[e]ment of First Amendment
rights.").
30. Id. at 772. It is not clear what relevance this observation has, or was intended to
have. That is, having already stated that Minnesota's "compelling" and "important"
interest in eradicating sex discrimination in public accommodations justified "even a
significant interference with the right of association," it is not clear what legal work was
done by the court's conclusory rejection of "the Jaycees' contention that its purpose would
be destroyed" by the Act's application. Id. at 771-72. The matter of the nature and extent
of the burden imposed on the Jaycees' freedom of association by the Act-as opposed to
the bare fact of such a burden-was considered in more detail by the Eighth Circuit and the
Supreme Court. See infra notes 31-60 and accompanying text.
31. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1579.
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displayed none of the District Court's ambivalence about the
existence of a fundamental right to association. "It is beyond
debate," he stated, quoting the Supreme Court's decision in
NAACP v. Alabama, "that freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect
of the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.'
33
Judge Arnold was convinced that the Jaycees was more than just
a business, that it engaged in a wide variety of activities-
including "political and ideological" ones-and that the Jaycees
and its activities were therefore protected by the First
Amendment. 34
To be sure, Judge Arnold acknowledged that "[e]ven First
Amendment rights . . . must yield at times to state interests, just
as that 'liberty' which the Due Process Clause protects is not
insulated from every assault of government ... Unlike the
trial court, however, Judge Arnold took up the question of "the
degree to which the State wishes to interfere with the [Jaycees']
right of association," as well as the "nature of the State interest
advanced to support the challenged interference., 36 He wrote:
The validity of a particular abridgement-in-fact can be
determined only after a careful analysis of the extent and
nature of the abridgement, the state interest asserted to
justify the abridgement, the extent to which this interest
will be impaired if the abridgement is set aside by the
courts, and the extent to which this interest can be
vindicated in less intrusive ways.
37
In Judge Arnold's view, the "abridgement" at issue here-i.e.,
"intrud[ing] upon [a] group's internal organization or integral
activities"-"goes to the heart of the kind of association that [the
Jaycees] has had and desires to continue, an association for the
advancement . . . of young men. If the statute is upheld, the
basic purpose of the Jaycees will change. ' 38 True, he conceded,
an "organization of young people, as opposed to young men,
32. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
33. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1566 (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460).
34. Id. at 1570.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 1570-71.
38. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1570-71 (emphasis added).
594
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may be more 'felicitous,' more socially desirable, in the view of
the State Legislature, or in the view of the judges of this Court,
but it will be substantially different from the Jaycees as it now
exists."
39
Now, with respect to the State's interest in eradicating
discrimination, Judge Arnold appeared to have no difficulty
agreeing with Judge Murphy that the interest was
"compelling., 40 However, he insisted, "whether the interest is
'compelling' enough to override the right asserted, is a question
that requires ... a more particularized analysis.' 4 1 He took note
of the fact, for example, that the "Jaycees [was] the only group
whose membership practices [had] ever been subjected" to the
Act and stated that "an asserted state interest that is being
applied only selectively appears to that extent weaker than a
state policy applied consistently and across the board."4 2  He
explained both that "upholding the claimed right of association
would impair the [State's interest] only to a limited extent," and
also that "there are other ways in which the state can express its
displeasure with the Jaycees' discriminatory membership
practice . . .,43
At the end of the day, as Judge Arnold recognized, "these
are questions of degree" and the "lines are not always clear
.... ,,44 Nor, he stated, after reviewing the relevant cases, was
the outcome clearly "controlled b Y45precedent. We must look,"
instead, "to principle and reason.' And, this examination for
Judge Arnold pointed toward the conclusion that
even though we might think that the Jaycees would survive,
even be improved, if women were admitted, some scope
must be given to the private choice of those who are now in
the organization. The right to choose with whom one will
39. Id. at 1571.
40. Id. at 1572.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1573.
43. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1572-73; see also id. at 1576 ("The interest of the state,
though compelling in the general sense, will be less seriously impaired than at first appears
if this challenged interference is prevented .... And the state has other ways, perhaps less
effective, but still powerful, to vindicate its interest.").
44. Id. at 1574.
45. Id. at 1576.
2005] 595
596 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:587
associate necessarily implies, within some limits, the right
also to choose with whom one will not associate. 6
So, the application of Minnesota's public-accommodations
statute to the Jaycees' membership policy was, on these facts,
not permitted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
47
The Supreme Court of the United States, without dissent,
reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling. 48  The Court, per the
Judge's friend, mentor, and former boss, Justice Brennan, agreed
with Judge Arnold that the First Amendment's protections
include safeguards for the freedom of expressive association.49
He agreed also with Judge Arnold that "[flreedom of association
... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.' 5 ° And, he
conceded that by "requiring the Jaycees to admit women as full
voting members," the Minnesota Human Rights Act
"interfere[d] with the internal organization or affairs" of the
46. Id.
47. Judge Lay dissented, stating that the "attempt of the Jaycees to exclude women
from their full membership seeks protection under . . . an outdated rationale of our
jurisprudence, one which relegated women to a status inferior to that of men." Jaycees,
709 F.2d at 1579 (Lay, J., dissenting). From the outset, then, it appears that Judge Lay
misunderstood the nature of the case, which was not about the "outdated rationale" for the
Jaycees' membership policy, but about the Jaycees' right, as an expressive association
protected by the First Amendment, to select its own members and craft its own message.
Judge Lay's charge, then, that the "Jaycees operate on the arbitrary sentiment that men
have a natural monopoly on such advocacies" and that "this only serves to perpetuate the
chauvinistic myth that women are incapable of dealing with such matters,"-even if the
charge were true-hardly seems to have engaged the Jaycees' claim, and Judge Arnold's
conclusion, that the First Amendment protected the Jaycees' right, within limits, to
"perpetuate .. .chauvinistic myth[s]." Id at 1580 (Lay, J., dissenting). Judge Lay also
contended that "speculative supposition[s] that the Jaycees' creed 'may' change if women
are granted equal privileges is a manifestly inadequate basis upon which to deprive the
state [of] its overpowering interest within this sphere of public accommodation[]." Id. at
1580-81 (Lay, J., dissenting).
48. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 612.
49. See id. at 622 ("[W]e have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others
in pursuit of a wide variety of . . . ends."). Justice Brennan distinguished the First
Amendment "freedom of expressive association" from the "freedom of intimate
association" included in the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 617-20.
Because the Jaycees chapters are "neither small nor selective," the Court held that they
"lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection [under the
intimate-association theory] to the decision of its members to exclude women." Id. at 621.
Judge Arnold had also recognized that "the Jaycees is not an intimate group," and that
"[t]his is hardly a private club, in the customary sense of that word.. Jaycees, 709
F.2d at 1571.
50. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
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Jaycees and therefore "infringe[d]" upon its freedom of
expressive association.
51
Unlike Judge Arnold, however, Justice Brennan and his
colleagues were "persuaded that Minnesota's compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens
justifie[d] the impact that application of the statute to the
Jaycees may have on the male members' associational
freedoms." 52  Unlike Judge Arnold, the Court concluded that
Minnesota had advanced this interest "through the least
restrictive means of achieving its ends. Indeed," Justice
Brennan continued, "the Jaycees has failed to demonstrate that
the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members'
freedom of expressive association., 53  After all, Minnesota's
requirement that the Jaycees admit women to full membership
did not, Justice Brennan reasoned, "impede the organization's
ability to engage in ... protected activities" and did not require
any "change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of
young men . . . .54 For Justice Brennan, the Jaycees' claim-
and Judge Arnold's view-that "by allowing women to vote,
application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or
impact of the organization's speech" rested on little more than
"sexual stereotyping" and "unsupported generalizations about
the relative interests and perspectives of men and women.
55
Finally, however-and even assuming that the Act's application
did cause "some incidental abridg[e]ment of the Jaycees'
protected speech"--the Justices agreed that the "effect is no




53. Id. at 626. This line of reasoning seems out of place; after all, if the application
of the Human Rights Act really imposed no "serious burdens" on the freedom of expressive
association, it is not clear why the Act's application should require justification under the
Court's strict-scrutiny methodology. What's more, just a few pages earlier, the Court had
acknowledged that the Act's application "infringe[d]" the Jaycees' First Amendment rights.
Id. at 623.
54. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627.
55. Id. at 628.
56. Id. The Court then noted that "acts of invidious discrimination"-considered
"wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit"-such as "violence or
other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from
their communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection." Id. But again,
2005] 597
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Justice O'Connor-at that time, of course, the Court's only
female member-agreed that the "application of the Minnesota
law to the Jaycees [did] not contravene the First Amendment
... . 57 In her opinion, the Court's approach was "both
overprotective of activities undeserving of constitutional shelter
and underprotective of important First Amendment concerns."
58
Justice O'Connor contended that the membership policies and
"occasional" expressive activities of commercial associations
should not enjoy the demanding protections of the First
Amendment-a "shopkeeper has no constitutional right to deal
only with persons of one sex"--and the Jaycees are best
regarded as a commercial organization.59 In cases involving
true expressive organizations, however, Justice O'Connor would
have avoided altogether searching judicial inquiries into the
"membership-message connection"; after all, "[w]hether an
association is or is not constitutionally protected in the selection
of its membership should not depend on what the association
says or why its members say it."
60
Justice Brennan would later write, in his own Tribute to
Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold, that "Judge Arnold rarely erred
in my view, but I was ready to provide a gentle guiding hand
when the occasion arose in Roberts v. United States Jaycees."
61
There can hardly be any doubt that Justice Brennan's
disagreement would have weighed heavily on Judge Arnold's
this line of argument seems in serious tension with the Court's earlier recognition that the
First Amendment protects a freedom of expressive association, which includes the right not
to associate, and that regulatory interference with an association's membership policies can
constitute an infringement upon that freedom.
57. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
58. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
59. Id. at 634, 638-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Judge Arnold had also recognized that, if the Jaycees and its activities were
"purely commercial," "this case would be easy. No extended analysis would be necessary
to show that the Jaycees must lose." Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1569. However, he insisted,
"much more is involved here." Id. "[T]he advocacy of political and public causes, selected
by the membership, is a not insubstantial part of what [the Jaycees] does." Id. at 1570.
60. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
61. William J. Brennan, Jr., Preface: A Tribute to Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold, 78
MINN. L. REv. 1, 2 (1993).
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own assessment of his opinion and reasoning, and must have
inspired him to reconsider it carefully. Still, in an interview with
one of his former law clerks, now-Professor Polly Price, given
almost exactly twenty years after the Supreme Court reversed
his decision, Judge Arnold re-affirmed his view that "the
stronger side [of the case] was the side of liberty, liberty of
association. " 62 He was aware, of course, that the ruling "wasn't
good politics"; he was aware also of the possibility that his
position had undermined his chances of serving in the Clinton
Administration or even as a Justice. 63  Notwithstanding his
respect and affection for Justice Brennan, though, Judge Arnold
continued to believe that the Court's opinion reversing him in
Jaycees "sounded strange" and that, "in principle, I think I did
the right thing."
64
So, did Judge Arnold do "the right thing"? For starters, it is
worth noting that, in recent years, in several high-profile First
Amendment cases, the Court seems to have moved closer to, if
not embraced explicitly, Judge Arnold's stance and approach in
Jaycees. In Hurley, for example, the Court concluded
unanimously that the First Amendment did not permit the
application of a Massachusetts public-accommodations law to
the decision by the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council
to exclude the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston from the St. Patrick's Day-Evacuation Day
parade.65 And, as Judge Arnold once observed, "the language in
[Hurley] reads a lot like my opinion [in Jaycees]. 66
Specifically, Justice Souter's majority opinion is-like
Judge Arnold's in Jaycees-sensitive to the very real, even if
diffuse and generalized, effect that a compelled change in a
speaker's identity and membership can have on the content and
effect of a speaker's message.67 "[T]he Constitution," Justice
Souter wrote, "looks be ond written or spoken words as
mediums of expression." And, he emphasized, "a private
62. Interview by Polly Price with Richard S. Arnold, Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Little Rock, Ark. (June 30, 2004) [hereinafter Interview].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 515 U.S. at 559.
66. Interview, supra note 62.
67. See generally Hurley, 515 U.S. 557.
68. Id. at 569.
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speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by
combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit their themes
to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech., 69 Judge Arnold had emphasized that the regulation at
issue in Jaycees "has the potential of changing" the content of
what the Jaycees are saying precisely "because it purports to
specify... the identity of those who may be Jaycees, and who
therefore [may] determine the content of what Jaycees say."7 °
Similarly, Justice Souter recognized in Hurley that the "selection
of contingents to make a parade" is protected by the First
Amendment, and that the "communication produced by the
[parade's] organizers would be shaped by all those . . . who
wished to join in with some expressive demonstration of their
own."
7 '
It is particularly interesting, in light of the salience in
contemporary policy and other conversations of "diversity" and
its value, that both Justice Brennan and Judge Lay seemed so
insistent that nothing more than chauvinistic stereotyping could
justify, or even explain, the Jaycees' view that requiring them to
admit women to full membership would alter its message on
important political, cultural, and moral issues. Justice Brennan's
and Judge Lay's assertions sound dated today, like the kind of
things one might have expected from an elderly, well-meaning,
liberal male jurist eager to say "the right thing" about sex
discrimination and stereotypes in the mid-1980s. Perhaps these
jurists felt comforted, and even righteous, in professing hostility
toward and even bewilderment at the idea that the admission of
women would affect, and perhaps alter, the expression and
message of the Jaycees.
Today, though, we are more likely to appreciate that the
make-up of communities and groups does affect their tones and
claims. In our debates over diversity in admissions, faculty
hiring, etc., nearly all of us accept the idea that a rich
conversation requires recruiting and retaining different kinds of
people, precisely because of the different perspectives they are
(perhaps simplistically) assumed to bring. It would seem, then,
that Judge Arnold was both correct, and prescient, in endorsing
69. Id. at 569-70.
70. 709 F.2d at 1576.
71. 515 U.S. at 570, 573.
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the Jaycees' contrary claim. As he concluded, a group has a
right to prefer a monochromatic or homogenous or "non-
diverse" conversation internally, and a clear, unconfused,
unvaried message externally. In any event, it is hard to see why
recognizing and implicitly endorsing the premise of today's
diversity arguments should have prompted such
incomprehension.
The Court's more recent-and more controversial-
decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale arguably comes even
closer to Judge Arnold's reasoning in Jaycees. In Dale, Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote a majority opinion invalidating, on
expressive-association grounds, the application of New Jersey's
public-accommodations law to the Boy Scouts' decision to expel
an openly gay assistant scoutmaster. In Dale, as in Jaycees, a
non-profit association's membership policies were challenged as
violating a state's anti-discrimination laws. 73  And, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court in Jaycees,
concluded that the First Amendment did not protect the group's
decision to exclude, or discriminate, concluding that Mr. Dale's
"membership does not violate [the] Boy Scouts' right of
expressive association because his inclusion would not 'affect in
any significant way [Boy Scouts] existing members' ability to
carry out their various purposes,' ' 74 or "compel [the] Boy
Scouts to express any message";75 the government's interest in
"eliminat[ing] the destructive consequences of discrimination
from our society" is essential; 76 and the public-accommodations
law burdened no more speech than was necessary to achieve this
goal. 77
Unlike the Jaycees Court, though, the Dale majority
refused to second-guess or scrutinize closely either the affected
association's own characterization of its own mission and
message or its assessment and predictions concerning distorting
effects of the non-discrimination law's application. It was
72. See generally 530 U.S. 640.
73. See id. at 644.
74. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1225 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Board of
Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)).
75. Id. at 1229.
76. Id. at 1227.
77. Id. at 1223.
78. See generally Dale, 530 U.S. 640.
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clear to Chief Justice Rehnquist that the Scouts "engage[] in
expressive activity," and he also insisted that "it is not the role of
the courts to reject a group's [characterization of its own]
expressed values because they disagree with those values or find
them internally inconsistent. 79  On the question of whether
New Jersey's public-accommodations law requirement of Mr.
Dale's "presence as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly
burden the Boy Scouts' desire not to 'promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior,"' the Chief Justice
stated, "As we give deference to an association's assertions
regarding the nature of its expression, we must also give
deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression." 80  Of particular importance, perhaps, was his
recognition that the message of the Scouts is not identical with,
or reducible to, the expression of its members. Thus, the fact
that some--even many-members of the Boy Scouts disagreed
with the Scouts' stated views concerning homosexual conduct
did not undermine or require judicial re-interpretation of the
association's message.8'
For the Dale majority, then, the application of New Jersey's
public-accommodations law was unconstitutional in this case,
notwithstanding Jaycees and similar cases, because "in . . .
[those] cases we ... conclude[d] that the enforcement of [the]
statutes would not materially interfere with the ideas that the
organization sought to express., 82 In Dale, on the other hand,
the "state interests embodied in New Jersey's public
79. Id. at 650-51.
80. Id. at 653. See also id at 654.
As the presence of GLIB in Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would have
interfered with the parade organizers' choice not to propound a particular
point of view, the presence of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as
surely interfere with the Boy Scouts' choice not to propound a point of view
contrary to its beliefs.
Id. The Court also noted, however, that this "is not to say that an expressive association
can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance
of a member from a particular group would impair its message." Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
81. Id. at 655-56 (stating that some members' disagreement with the Scouts was
"irrelevant" and that the "fact that the organization does not trumpet its views from the
housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does not mean that its views receive
no First Amendment protection").
82. Id. at 657.
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accommodations law [did] not justify such a severe intrusion on
the Boy Scouts' right[] to freedom of expressive association.
83
Now, the question of whether Judge Arnold was correct in
persisting in the belief that he "did the right thing" in Jaycees is
certainly not answered merely by noting that the Supreme
Court's recent expressive-association decisions read a bit more
like Judge Arnold's than like Justice Brennan's. I am confident
that Judge Arnold would agree-indeed, he acknowledged as
much, at least implicitly, in Jaycees-that conscientious and
reasonable people could disagree about the extent to which the
Jaycees' First Amendment rights were burdened, about the
"weight" of those rights as against the non-discrimination values
underlying the public-accommodations law, and about the
closeness of the fit between the expression-burdening regulation,
on the one hand, and the state's compelling policy interest, on
the other.84
All that said, it strikes me that Judge Arnold's opinion is
consistent with a rich understanding of the First Amendment's
"freedom of speech" and with an appropriate appreciation for
the structural and other contributions to that freedom of
expressive associations and their messages. To be sure
although some scholars have found much to celebrate in Dale,
the Court's expressive-association doctrine and decisions are
vulnerable to fair criticism. For starters, and to state the
obvious, the First Amendment itself says nothing about the
freedom of association, expressive or otherwise. 86 For a jurist
who has been characterized-as Richard S. Arnold has-as
83. Id. at 659.
84. See, e.g., 709 F.2d at 1576 ("[O]ur decision is not controlled by precedent."); id.
at 1574 ("Obviously these are questions of degree. The lines are not always clear .... ).
85. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation:
The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving
Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 485 (2002); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and Schools, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 1917 (2001).
86. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142
(2002) [hereinafter Agenda] (noting that Dale cannot be explained as a "textualist" decision
because, "of course[,] the First Amendment does not enumerate any freedom of
association"); id. at 1157 ("[T]here can be no doubt that Dale displays, textually speaking,
a most generous and expansive approach to constitutional meaning."). See also Jed
Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DuKE L.J. 289, 296-97 (2001) [hereinafter
Constitution].
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"Justice Black revived,, 87 this might impose at least a minor
hurdle in the way of a conclusion that an association's "freedom
of expressive association" prevents the application of an
otherwise-valid anti-discrimination law.8 8  In part for this
reason, one prominent critic of Dale, Professor Jed Rubenfeld,
has concluded that the case should be regarded not so much as a
vindication of First Amendment freedoms but as a manifestation
of some Justices' substantive opposition to the anti-
discrimination agenda underlying public-accommodations
laws. 89
Now, there is certainly something to the argument-noted
by both Judge Murphy and Justice Brennan9 0 -that the First
87. John P. Frank & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Brief Biography of Judge Richard
S. Arnold, 78 MINN. L. REV. 5, 23 (1993).
88. Judge Arnold acknowledged, in Jaycees, that the First "Amendment does not
contain the word 'association,' nor does any other portion of the Constitution ...." 709
F.2d at 1566. Nevertheless, he concluded, "There are rights protected by the federal
Constitution that are not specifically spelled out in so many words in that document.
Among these rights is the... freedom of association ...." Id. at 1568. In one of Judge
Arnold's best-known opinions-Henne v. Wright-he expressed the view that the
Constitution protected the right of a woman to pick a surname for her baby even if the child
lacked a legally established connection to the man (i.e., the child's father) whose name she
wanted to give the child. 904 F.2d 1208, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Judge Arnold stated:
The right of privacy is not the beneficiary of explicit textual protection in the
federal Constitution. It is an unenumerated right .... People existed, and had
rights, before there was such a thing as government .... The source of rights
was not the State, but, as the Declaration of Independence put it, the
"Creator."
Id. at 1216-17 (Arnold, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Agenda, supra note 86, at 1142 ("It is possible that an anti-antidiscrimination
agenda, deeply felt but as yet poorly theorized, is working itself out in the current Court's
jurisprudence."). Professor Rubenfeld has criticized Dale directly and in detail elsewhere,
too. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767
(2001).
90. See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 628.
[A]cts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available
goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has
a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such
conduct may transmit. Accordingly, like violence or other types of
potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their
communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no constitutional
protection.
Jaycees, 534 F. Supp. at 770; see also id (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470
(1973)) ("'Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising
freedom of association .. .but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections."').
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Amendment does not provide protection against the application
to conduct of otherwise-valid laws and regulations simply
because that conduct is animated by, colored by?, or freighted
with some expressive or ideological motivation. As Professor
Rubenfeld puts it,
Imagine an ordinary case in which a person claims that an
otherwise constitutional law cannot be applied to him
because he wants to engage in the prohibited conduct for
'expressive' reasons. Tax protesters make this kind of
claim every day. Normally, this kind of claim is not
thought to raise any significant free speech problems.
92
Put differently, "[p]eople are not supposed to get First
Amendment immunityjust because they want to break a law for
expressive purposes." 93 So, why should the Boy Scouts' or the
Jaycees' discriminatory conduct be treated differently from the
tax protester's ideologically motivated violations? Professor
Rubenfeld asks:
The objection, then, to the Court's reasoning in Dale is this:
why are the Boy Scouts any different from tax protesters?
The Boy Scouts want to violate a law in order to
communicate a message. So do tax protesters. The Boy
Scouts say that their ability to communicate a view that
they sincerely and centrally hold will be significantly
impaired if they are made to comply with the law. So do
tax protesters. The Boy Scouts feel they will be forced to
communicate a deeply obnoxious message if made to obey
the law. So do tax protesters. But the tax protester's claim
will be dismissed. His claim gets no strict scrutiny. Why is
the same not true of the Boy Scouts?
94
In my view, expressive-association cases are--or, at least,
can reasonably be regarded as-different than the hypothetical
tax-protester cases. In the former, the better way to frame the
issue is not "should this act of discrimination be exempted from
valid anti-discrimination laws simply because it is expressive or
ideologically motivated?" Rather, the question should be, "may
91. Cf, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
92. Agenda, supra note 86, at 1157; see also Constitution, supra note 86, at 297
(discussing tax-protester example).
93. Constitution, supra note 86, at 298.
94. Id.
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the government require non-commercial, private associations to
accept as members and leaders persons whose presence or
leadership will, in the associations' view, undermine or
transform their values and message?, 95  That is, in cases like
Jaycees, Hurley, and Dale, the issue is not so much whether the
First Amendment somehow launders externally-directed, other-
regarding conduct that the legislature has the power to prohibit
and punish. The conduct at issue-i.e., discrimination in
membership and leadership-is of First Amendment concern not
simply because it is freighted with or motivated by ideas, but
because it goes to the structure and identity of the association as
an association. It would seem sensible, for example, to
distinguish for First Amendment purposes between requiring the
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws
("NORML") to admit anti-drug crusaders and requiring
NORML to comply with laws prohibiting the distribution of
controlled substances.
The Scouts' "discrimination" is not protected by the First
Amendment simply because it "communicate[s]" a message, but
because an expressive association's membership and leadership
is integral to its ability to play an important role in nurturing the
"freedom of speech." The point is, the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment includes, and is well served
by, protections not only for associations' members-their
privacy rights, their own speech rights, and so on-but also for
their own identity, distinctiveness, and message. As I have
discussed in more detail elsewhere, expressive associations play
an important structural role in our civil society and discourse;
95. In Jaycees, Judge Arnold evoked a similar distinction, in his discussion of
Runyon v. McCrary, where the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited a private school
from discriminating on the basis of race. Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1575 (citing Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)). Distinguishing the case, Judge Arnold noted that
admission of a student to a school has nothing necessarily to do with the
school's own internal governance. Nonpublic schools are governed by their
owners or boards of trustees, not by a vote of the student body. The Jaycees,
on the other hand, is governed by its members and their elected
representatives, and a change in the makeup of the membership could well
result in a change in the ideas or dogma that the organization propagates.
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they are not merely repositories for the views and commitments
of individuals.96 I have argued:
[W]e are who we are, and flourish to the extent that we do,
because of the associations in which we're "nested" ....
[A]ssociations are not simply vehicles for self-actualizing
choices by autonomous monads. They might be that, too,
but they are more than just that. That is, while it is true that
we speak and express ourselves through associations, we
are also spoken to and formed by them and by their
expression."
Expressive associations, then, can be treated differently
under the First Amendment, and their "discrimination" can be
treated differently, because of the role they play, as mediating
institutions, in protecting political freedoms and checking
government power.98 In other words:
[A]ssociations are about social structure as much as self-
expression. They get in the way just as they facilitate.
They are the hedgerows of civil society. They are wrenches
in the works of whatever hegemonizing ambitions
government might be tempted to indulge .... They hold
back the bulk of government and are the "critical buffers
between the individual and the power of the State." They
are "laboratories of innovation" that clear out the civic
space needed to "sustain the expression of the rich
pluralism of American life." Associations are not only
conduits for expression, they are the scaffolding around
which civil society is constructed, in which personal
freedoms are exercised, in which loyalties are formed and
transmitted, and in which individuals flourish. 99
96. See generally Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Education
and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001) [hereinafter
Associations]. That is, associations are more than-in John Garvey's words--"procedural
device[s] for coordinating large numbers of similar interests . JOHN H. GARVEY,
WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 149 (1996).
97. Associations, supra note 96, at 1849 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
98. Cf Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48 (noting that the freedom of association is "crucial in
preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other,
perhaps unpopular, ideas").
99. Associations, supra note 96, at 1853-54 (quoting Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618-19;
PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 36 (1977)).
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This structural view of associations and their role in civil
society is not set out in Judge Arnold's Jaycees opinion, but I
believe it is consonant with his approach, with his work in some
other cases, and with his civil-libertarian commitments
generally. Judge Arnold would have appreciated, I believe, the
force of the claim that the expression-and the expressive,
message-protecting and message-forming conduct-of
associations should be protected because of the work
associations do in providing ideological competition for the
state. 100  In Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, for
example, he joined an opinion (later reversed by the Supreme
Court) invalidating on First Amendment grounds a Minnesota
statute prohibiting multiple-party nominations in the general
election. 10 1 That opinion's emphasis on the importance to the
political process of competition and on the dangers of state
efforts to manage our political conversations is consonant, I
think, with Judge Arnold's reasoning in Jaycees and with the
account of the freedom of association outlined above. In Forbes
v. Arkansas Educational Television Commission-yet another
case in which Judge Arnold's involvement seems to have spelled
doom for the ruling in the Supreme Court-Judge Arnold agreed
with Ralph Forbes, a fringe candidate for Congress who had
been excluded by a government-owned television station from a
candidates' debate, that the First Amendment does not permit
state actors to discriminate against "non-viable" candidates in
this way: "Political viability is a tricky concept," he insisted. 1
02
"We should leave it to the voters at the polls, and to the
professional judgment of nongovernmental journalists. A
journalist employed by the government is still a government
employee."' 0 3 And, in Richenberg v. Perry-a case involving a
challenge to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy with
respect to gays and lesbians-Judge Arnold reminded us that
100. Id. at 1854 (stating that associations are "the state's competitors in the arena of
education and formation); id. at 1856 ("[T]he expression of free and independent
associations competes with the liberal state for the honor of shaping our souls.").
101. 73 F.3d 196 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New
Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
102. 93 F.3d 497, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
103. Id. at 505.
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"'[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power 
to control men's minds."' 104
In sum, it would seem a mistake-or at least too hasty-to
write off Judge Arnold's Jaycees opinion as the product of an
"off-day," or as an anomalous failure to understand the stakes in
a case involving the conflict between state power and individual
rights. (The opinion is anomalous in one way, however: it is
one of the longest opinions the Judge ever wrote.)
Justice Brennan himself recognized that "Judge Arnold has
consistently vindicated the First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of the press and freedom of speech, even in cases in
which the protected expression was controversial, distasteful, or
hateful."'10 5 Judge Arnold's ruling and reasoning in Jaycees, it
seems to me, is of a piece with this commendable legacy.
104. 97 F.3d 256, 264 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969)).
105. Brennan, supra note 61, at 1-2.
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